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A CONTINENTAL LAWYER IN AN AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOL: TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS
OF ADJUSTMENT *
MIRJAN DAMAIA

Nous ne nous sommes pas faits,
comme des notes de musique les
uns pour les autres parce que
diffirents?
Andr4 Maurois
When you pause to consider the problem indicated by the title,
your first reaction may be that it is too general to be meaningful. Is
there any justification for using the broad label "Continental lawyer"?
Can we lump together European lawyers from various countries, east
and west? Is the topic not inextricably bound up with the great
controversies raging over the existence, distinguishing characteristics,
and interrelationships of various families of law? Is there any consensus on common features of legal education here or abroad? In
sum, are there not so many qualifications on anything one may choose
to say on this subject that the total view is lost? Even with all these
difficulties in mind, the more I reflect on the problem and exchange
experiences with people who have gone through the same process of
adjustment, the more I become persuaded that a number of significant
points can be made on the general theme suggested in the title. Notwithstanding the great differences existing among them-and in spite
of orientation programs-most lawyers trained in Continental law
schools face rather similar difficulties in approaching the study of law
in an American educational institution.
I shall impose arbitrary limitations on my discussion. As I
proceed it will become increasingly obvious that there exists a close
and probably reversible relationship between the nature of a legal
system and patterns of legal education. However, not all difficulties in
adjustment result from problems of acclimation to an alien legal system.
* Adapted from a talk given to the graduate students at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in March 1968.
t Visiting Professor of Comparative Law 1966-68, University of Pennsylvania.
Professor of Law, University of Zagreb (Yugoslavia). LL.B. 1955, University of
Zagreb (Yugoslavia). D.J. 1960, University of Ljubljana (Yugoslavia). Bicentennial
Fellow 1961, University of Pennsylvania.
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Some stem from exposure to different educational methods. Yet the
latter will be dealt with only sparingly, through comments often relegated to footnotes. I will not attempt any explanation of the problems
of adjustment in terms of the divergent histories of legal education on
the Continent and in Anglo-Saxon countries. But in spite of these
limitations I can achieve clarity only at the price of substantial
simplification. It would seem to me that, in this general area, efforts
to present minor offsetting tendencies only too often result in loss
of clear vision. It takes a Breughelian talent I do not possess to
deal with all the minutiae and still preserve the clear simplicity of the
tableau. I can only hope that simplification will not be carried to the
point of distortion and that those who have gone through all the pain
and travail of adjustment will still be able to recognize, somewhat
caricatured, bits and pieces of their own experience.
A good point of departure seems to me to be a description of what
is imparted to a law student in the course of his legal education in a
European university. Thus, at the very outset I will offer a broad
generalization. From there I shall go on to give a summary account
of what a finished product of a Continental law school expects to
derive from his exposure to American legal education. Here, you will
realize that I am dealing mostly with the expectations of those with
an academic, rather than a practitioner's, interest in American law.
In the third part of my presentation I shall catalogue the more important difficulties arising out of the clash between expectations and
reality. I will conclude by venturing a few suggestions for ameliorating
the adjustment problems faced by the typical Continental law student.
I. EUROPEAN LEGAL EDUCATION
As in this country, so in European countries there is a great deal
of controversy over the aims of legal education and the role universities
should play in it. Traditional ideas on curricula as well as methods
of instruction are increasingly questioned; new ideas are discussed and,
in some countries, experimented with. Yet notwithstanding these
winds of change and the considerable differences that exist among
various European countries, fluctuation and diversity fade away when
viewed from this side of the Atlantic. A distinctive Continental mos
iura docendi still seems to exist. As I see it, one can distill the
essential ingredients of Continental law school experience. This
essence involves exposure to what I will call the grammar of law, a
panoramic view of the most important fields of law, and some initiation
into the patterns of legal reasoning. These three essential ingredients
must be treated separately although they are imparted simultaneously.
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The Grammar of Law
While it would be false to imply that grammar is completely
absent from American law, the fact remains that there exists no real
counterpart to the Continental grammar of law.' The difference is
perhaps in the degree of refinement and importance of grammar in
the two systems.
In order to gain an understanding of Continental legal grammar,
Americans should imagine lawyers of an analytical turn of mind i la
Hohfeld at work for a long time, studying the law as it emerged from
legal practice. Americans should further imagine that both the
analysts' dissection of law and their generalizations were generally
accepted by the legal profession. Let me pursue this hypothesis with
specific examples and suggest what the consequences might be for
American law.
Many rather amorphous American legal concepts would be subjected to rigorous analysis. An illustration is the concept of jurisdiction with its bewildering number of meanings. Words and phrases
like "property," "standing to sue," "security," and "mens rea" also
come to mind. In the process of analysis the twilight zone of the
concepts would be somewhat reduced, sub-concepts isolated and separately labeled. A richer and more precise legal terminology would
appear. Movement would also proceed in the opposite direction, that
is, toward the creation of more general, sometimes almost cathedrallike concepts. For example, inquiry into what contracts, conveyances
and wills have in common would probably result in something similar
to the Continental concept of legal transaction (Rechtsgeschift, negoZio
giuridico). These newly created, broad concepts would become
accepted as elements of standard legal terminology. Study would
then proceed to the relationships between such legal concepts. Questions would be raised about the relationship of "jurisdictional" to
"procedural" issues, of "mistake" to "mens rea." Inquiry into relationships between concepts would be linked to an investigation into the
nature or essence of concepts. For example, what is the nature of
"arbitration," or of "pleadings" and "stipulations" in criminal procedure? Pursuit of what is common to the decisional law of seemingly
unrelated areas would be conducive to the creation of broader rules
1 The expression "grammar of law" has been borrowed from T. HOLLAND, THE
ELEMENTS or JURisPRUDENcE 7 (5th ed. 1895). This metaphoric term is not used on
the Continent. Instead, labels such as "legal science" or "doctrine" are found. (For
an American reference to "scientific legal terminology," see Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)). However, I decided to use it because of its vividness
and because it suggests comparison with linguistics. Is it not true that languages like

French, German or Russian have more grammar and much more standardization of

proper usage than American English? While grammar in this country seems mostly
descriptive, is not grammar prescriptive in most European languages?
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(e.g., on misreprentation in conveyances, contracts, and so forth) and
even to the development of principles (e.g., principles of procedure).2
Almost imperceptibly an urge to establish a rigid network of classification would develop; for example, the question whether we should
separate real and personal property would arise. Thus, step by step,
the conceptual digestion of the law would result in a network of
precise interrelated concepts, broad principles and classificatory ideas.
This network is the grammar of law.
Most American lawyers will be sceptical at best of the usefulness
of this curious conceptual structure. Some, conversant with the latest
trends in jurisprudential thinking abroad, will point out not only that
analytical work has fallen into disrepute in this country, but that the
conceptualistic approach seems to be coming under increasing attack in
Europe as well. It is my belief, however, that even those Continentals
to whom conceptualistic jurisprudence is a bte noire would be taken
aback at the paucity of conceptual digestion in most areas of American
law. Contracts and especially criminal law would be glaring examples.
I submit that even Continental "doubting Thomases," if invited to
deal with practical legal problems, would rally to the support of legal
grammar, on the condition that it remain-just as in language-in
an ancillary role. Even anti-conceptualists would, I believe, concur
in the traditional justifications advanced by Continentals in defense
of their legal grammar.
Let me quickly sketch these often overlapping justifications. In
the first place, it is claimed that a well developed legal grammar results
in economy of thought. The concepts in such a grammar can be used
independently of specific legal rules, just as elements in an algebraic
system, and with all the advantages of algebra over arithmetic. Pursuing mathematical analogies, one can say that the urge to generalize
r~sults in factoring out common features, thus leading to simplification.
A great many heretofore unrelated legal rules can be seen as offshoots
of a single more general rule or principle.
A related advantage attributed to legal grammar is clarity of vision,
sometimes expressed by the old Latin tag praxis sine theoria caecus
in via. Broad interrelated concepts facilitate awareness of the ramifications of hypothetical legal situations, notably contemplated changes
in the law. Thus law can more easily be tested by logic. It is further
2

The work of legal theorists does not stop here. Insight into what they do
further in a specific field may be gained from Schmidt, Von Sinn und NotwendigFUR DIE
keit wissenschaftlicher Behandlung des Strafprozessrechts, 65 ZEITSCHRU
GESA-Ar STRAFRECwrSWISSENSCHAFT 161 (1953). Of late it has become fashionable
in some countries to conceive of certain legal concepts and classifications as ontological
entities. See DIE ONTOLOGISCHE BEGRtNDUNG DES REcnTS (A. Kaufmann ed. 1965).
However, these much more cosmic questions do not affect the outlook of the ordinary

young lawyer, the typical finished product of a Continental law school.
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believed that profound analysis of the law sometimes fosters a sense
of the proper order of analysis.' This in turn goes a long way towards
shielding the average legal mind from confusion. Finally, it is believed that legal grammar represents an essential prerequisite for the
satisfactory drafting of comprehensive legislation" and the successful
ordering of judge-made law. 5
The importance attached to legal grammar explains why initiation
into it represents one of the minimal requirements of legal education in
Continental law schools. Even a casual glance at any student manual
will immediately reveal the extent to which "grammatical" considerations dictate the organization and presentation of the body
of law.
The Panoramic View
In addition to an initiation into the grammar of law, the Continental student is also offered what would, to an American lawyer,
appear to be a panoramic presentation of the most important fields of
law. This comprehensive view of the whole is considered to be of
utmost importance. It is feared that if the young lawyer fails to
perceive the great contours of private and public law in school, he
will seldom acquire an overview later in practice. Entangled in the
jungle of practical problems, he will be deprived of the guidance that
comes from an awareness of the totality of law in his particular field.
The way in which the panoramic view is offered would be rather
startling to an American lawyer. Even aside from discussion of the
highly abstract legal issues closely connected with the Continental
legal grammar,6 discourse proceeds most of the time on a level that
seems much too abstract to the American legal mind. Statutory or
code provisions are systematically presented on a level which seems to
3 Proper order, of course, imposes limitations on levels of analysis. An excellent
example of the proper order of analysis imposed by analytical work can be found in
Ryu & Silving, Toward a RationalSystem of CriminalLaw, 32 RVISTA JURIDICA DE LA
Another illustrative example of the
UNIVERSDAD DE PORTO Rico 119, 126-37 (1963).
self-imposed order of analysis can be found in the manipulation of the ordre public
device in Continental conflict of laws. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW CASES
-TE XT-MATERIALS 470-76 (2d ed. 1959).
4 Legal grammar may offer a basis for logical rather than alphabetical arrangement of subject-matter. Further, it is possible that only legal grammar of some
sophistication can provide a basis for avoiding antinomies and omissions in interrelated
provisions. Finally, the wealth of long-range and intermediate concepts provides
statutory language with the necessary breadth.
5 For example, French administrative law, created by the Conseil d'ttat, has been
very neatly ordered by French legal scholars.
6Those who feel a need for an illustration should take a look at any Continental
text; such treatises usually duplicate in manual form the professor's oral presentation.
Perhaps as good an example as any in English translation is S. DAND6, JAPANESE
Examples of topics connected with the Continental
CRIMINAL PROcEDURE (1965).
grammar are "the essential nature of the law of criminal procedure," id. at 20; "basic
concepts," id. at 125; "general elements of procedural acts," id. at 156.
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provide only vague guidelines for the solution of actual cases. Occasional references to actual cases will almost invariably be made in
generalized form. The legal problems in a case will be treated in the
abstract, as illustrations of how the court evolved legal rules, adapted
to the solution of the case, from the more general ones found in the
code or statute. When on a rare occasion the discussion does descend
to the level of particular facts, it will be abruptly cut off by the remark
that a questio facti is involved which does not merit further analysis.7
The American lawyer would thus discover that, more often than not,
where his interest really begins the law teacher's seems to end. A
related and similar source of distress to an American would be the
paucity of references to the meaning of legal rules in practical operation.
He would be shocked to find that as much time is devoted to analysis
of legal problems of only academic interest as to problems commonly
confronting the courts. Almost never would he find discussion of the
He
influence of procedural considerations on substantive issues.'
still
that
of
instruction
method
by
the
annoyed
positively
be
would
prevails in Continental law schools, with formal and not infrequently
somewhat soporific lectures. Faced with professorial assertion on the
basis of what to him seemed vague and inconclusive authorities, he
would be tempted to think that the teacher was getting his law out
of his head. I believe he would soon decide that he could make equally
good (or bad) use of his time by reading lectures in the form of
scripta, or by studying the professor's manual or treatise.9
Patterns of Legal Reasoning
By American standards, Continental law schools give very little
training in "how to think like a lawyer." Stimulation of students to
participate in problem solving (on the Continental level of discourse),
while not unknown, is comparatively insignificant. This is not to say
that patterns of thinking are not implanted in students, if only through
7 "Questio facti" is a misnomer and should not be confused with factual issues.
It is a legal issue, but so closely intertwined with the factual circumstances of specific
cases that it is of little academic interest to a civilian mind. For instance, what constitutes probable cause for arrest, being a mere questio facti, would not be discussed in
class.
8 Hence the suprise of a Continental who, having explained a refined civilian
distinction to his American colleague, is asked: "How do you go about establishing the
distinction in court?"
0 Whether the professor's talents are put to the best use in the traditional formal
lecture is open to question even in Continental minds. The famous 17th century
German lawyer Benedict Carpzov is alleged to have hired a singer from the Leipzig
opera to read Carpzov's Vorlesungen to his students. It is not at all unlikely-horresco
referenvs-that the singer was far more stimulating than the professor. However, many
Continental lawyers of great reputation and comparative experience advocate the traditional lecture method. See, e.g., Tunc & Tunc, Le droit des .8tats-Unisd'Anerique,
in SOURCES rr TECHNIQUES 317 (1955).
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exposure to the style of thinking of the faculty. Let me present a very
cursory sketch of this style, for it is important for my purposes.10 Very
characteristic is an urge to relate particular problems to a whole array
of rules, principles and "grammatical" ideas. Logical consistency
within the array assumes a very great importance. Seldom does one
find the feeling that discussion of rules apart from judicial application
is somewhat vacuous. There is a significant lack of the argumentative
approach towards the law which permeates the atmosphere of law
schools in this country. The moving spirit of analysis is not the
desire to find the best argument for a proposition, but rather the
quest for the "right" answer to the problem at hand. Conspicuous by
its absence is the intertwining of legal and nonlegal arguments so
common here. 1
Comparatively speaking there is also very little preparation in
Continental law schools for the practical problems awaiting the student
(handling of sources, legal writing, and the like). But even though
vocationally oriented education represents an inferior intellectual tradition to the Continental lawyer, I do not think that a typical Continental
law professor is insensitive to the needs of practical training. He
would agree that a full-fledged lawyer needs practical as well as
theoretical preparation. Theoria sine praxis rota sine axis. However,
he will probably argue that theoretical and practical preparation cannot
both be offered in school, and that a choice of priorities must be made.
Since in the Continental scheme of things theoretical preparation and
a grasp of the whole must precede exposure to the complexities of
10 In drawing a cursory sketch I cannot avoid the danger of making this style of
thinking look like the pure conceptualistic jurisprudence which, as I have pointed out,
has been largely rejected in Europe. It is also possible that even a much more precise
presentation of Continental reasoning would still appear unadulterated conceptualism
to most Americans, while the Continental would classify the reasoning as being at a
safe distance from Begriffsjurisprudenz. I draw some consolation from the fact that
much of American legal reasoning would appear to Continentals to be an exercise in
Freirechtslehre. Since the identification of Continental reasoning with excessive conceptualism seems unavoidable, I do not think much further damage will be done if I
suggest to those looking for a short example Max Rheinstein's illustration in his
Introduction to M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY xliii (M. Rheinstein ed.
1954). Those who want to pursue the matter should compare Learned Hand's reasoning in Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d
Cir. 1930) with the civilian treatment of the same case by Oscar Morineau in Rights
and Remedies, 8 Am. J. ComP. L. 263 (1959). Morineau's handling of concepts like
"right of action" and "legal remedy" in his pursuit of a "scientific solution" is as good
an example as any of what I mean to convey in the text.
11 A casual look at law school curricula in European countries will reveal that
much time is devoted to economics, sociology and similar disciplines. Yet after my
experience in this country I do not think there is much functional integration of various
interdisciplinary insights on the Continent. A Brandeis brief would be a great surprise
to Continentals. Merryman's observation on cultural agnosticism in the Italian style
of legal thinking, as well as many other of his lucid observations, hold true of the
Continental style in general. See Merryman, The Italian Style I: Doctrine, 18 STAN.
L. REv. 39, 52 (1965).
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practice, precedence is given to rendering instruction in the grammar
of law and in the grand contours of most important fields of law. It is
upon graduation and during the internship period preceding the bar
and bench examinations that the student receives a rigorous practical
training in how to find the law and write about it.
The three components may now be drawn together. If a Continental student has acquired some mastery of legal grammar, if he
has learned the substantive rules as presented in the panoramic view,
and if he has gained some grasp of the style of thinking described, he
is a successful product of Continental legal education on the university
level.

II.

THE EXPECTATIONS OF A CONTINENTAL LAWYER

When the Continental law school graduate enters practice, the
neatness, simplicity, and purity of the vision of the law imparted to
him in school will be somewhat marred. Yet, even after extended
legal practice most of the attitudes shaped in school, somewhat modified, will still influence his perception of law. Of course, if he is fresh
from law school-as are many foreigners in American law schools-the
impact of his legal education will be undiluted in its strength. Some
features of the young lawyer's outlook should concern us here.
He will tend to associate at least modern domestic law with a
more or less closed and orderly system. He will assume that precise
terminology, conceptual specificity, and other elements of the Continental legal grammar are indispensable tools for mature legal analysis.
Sensitivity toward logical consistency over relatively wide areas will

appear to him to be an attribute of a good lawyer. It will seem natural
to be able to gain a panoramic view of legal fields. He will believe
that legal discourse of real importance proceeds on the level of rules he
is familiar with, and that emphasis on factual questions and too much
concern about justice in a given case betray a non-technical, layman's
approach-what Max Weber called "khadi justice."

1

For him the

primary purpose of legal discussion-at least in the academic milieuwill be the quest for right answers rather than partisan arguments.
What does a lawyer with a more or less pronounced outlook of
this sort expect to derive from the study of law in an American law
school? I think it is realistic to assume that the lawyer's interest will
be focused on a given field of law in his civilian classificatory scheme.
For example, he will be interested in what to him is "property law"
(law of things) and therein "ownership" or "real actions," or in what
12M. WEBE, supra note 10, at 213.
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to him is "administrative law" and therein "police power." Very
high on his list of priorities will be the desire to gain an understanding
of the American conceptual technique in law, which, he is told, differs
from his own. He will, for instance, want to know how the American
concept of jurisdiction relates to his concept of jurisdiction. What
exactly is waiver? Can estoppel be associated with venire contra
factum propriurn? Is there a functional counterpart for ius cogens
and ius dispositivum, for "ordinary" and "extraordinary" legal remedies, causa or "unlawfulness" (Rechtswidrigkeit) ? 13 In sum, he will
expect to learn the conversion formulae whereby his indispensable tools
of analysis may be made applicable in the context of foreign (American) law. I submit that the desire for conceptual counterparts represents a pressing cognitive need for most lawyers coming from the
Continent, even if their ultimate aim is to compare the fulfillment of
social needs through legal devices.
In the field of his choice the student will also expect to gain a
panoramic view corresponding to the one he possesses of his discipline
in his native system. For example, one interested in procedural problems and more specifically in "legal remedies against judgments" will
expect to gain a comprehensive view of American ideas on direct and
collateral attack. Or, to choose a more dramatic example, a student
of criminal law would want to gain a synthetic view of the "general
part of American substantive criminal law." He will assume that
this preliminary job of getting the feel for the grand contours will not
take much time or effort. There will be, he expects, manuals or other
sources that will synthesize the kinds of problems that are, in his
system, always discussed in connection with "legal remedies" or
problems of the "general part of criminal law." He will expect that,
having obtained the general orientation in his field, he can then study
more closely what to him is already a quite specific problem, such as
coram nobis in post-conviction remedies, or specific intent in the
"general part." If he has a keen mind, he will expect to pursue his
study even further, to more limited problems which will resemble the
scope of a typical American law review article. This gradual descent
from the general to the specific will, I submit, be another cognitive need
of the Continental. He will want first to inspect the forest, the trees,
then turn to branches and twigs. Specific problems of litigation on the
level of his questiones facti will be even further down the line. But
before he gets engrossed in these problems, he will feel he must satisfy
his more pressing cognitive needs.
13 The analogue of the last concept will be of interest primarily to those Continentals whose legal systems were subjected to the influence of German scholars. Need
I point out that there is no concept of Rechtswidrigkeit in this country?
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III. THE CLASH BETWEEN EXPECTATION AND REALITY

If there is a measure of truth in the preceding description of
expectations, the problems faced by a Continental lawyer attempting to
adjust to a typical American law school are not too difficult to fathom.
I cannot hope to discuss them all, so I shall limit myself to the most
pressing.
There will be a stumbling block at the very first step. The
foreigner will immediately discover that his specialty has no real
counterpart in the American scheme of divisions of law. The student
with an interest in property law will vainly seek "real actions" in
American writing on property. On the other hand he will find matters
inserted in the law of property that seem to be taken out of their
natural habitat. Thus he will find the lease treated as a "real right"
while its proper situs, to his mind, is in the law of obligations. To the
possible chagrin of a privatist, taxation and zoning problems will also
be incorporated into property books.
Some will say that there is nothing undesirable about this initial
problem, for the student is just learning his first lesson in comparative
legal studies, namely, to discard domestic boundaries of law. Many
students, however, for all their orientation programs, spend a disproportionate amount of time chasing the topic of their interest all
over the American legal landscape.
Sooner or later they will assemble what to them is comparable
matter and select the right law school courses. Quite naturally they
will attempt to gain the panoramic view described above. It is at
this point that they will be in real trouble: courses will be of no help
to them in this respect. Even if instruction is not limited to the
Socratic discussion of cases, Continental students will still have the
feeling of being offered an assembly of miniscule fragments when they
want a synthesis.' 4 They will then resort to hornbooks and similar
writings designed for those who, unencumbered by an alien legal
training, seek basic information in an American branch of law. These
books will seldom be of help. Their organization, unspoken assumptions, and general level of discussion will present to a Continental legal
mind more questions than answers. Ever present will be the need
for conversion formulae. If the students seek help from their instructor, he will explain that the view of the whole which they seek
cannot be given even in a single jurisdiction, much less nationally.
At least some instructors will be sceptical that such an instantaneous
14 Continentals often wonder how students can be capable of discussing difficult
cases and intricate problems-Grezzsitationenz--without preparation in more elementary matters and settled areas of law. But as I cautioned at the outset, I cannot
go into the difficulties stemming from the Socratic method.
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snapshot of the law can be offered at all, for law is living, constantly
growing. To this the student will reply that he can see the twigs and
branches of the system changing all the time, but that he would have
expected the trees and the forest to be relatively stable. And, he will
add, it is precisely the latter two that he is interested in at the moment.
Not infrequently, in the absence of comparativists, there will be a
difficulty in further communication at this point.
After exposure to the finely shaded rigidities of the Continental
legal grammar, the student will discover that it has virtually no
analogue in American law, and that very little importance is attached
to the conceptual digestion of the law. He will find that definitions,
so important to his mind, are viewed with a scepticism reminiscent of
classical Roman lawyers.
In the meantime the Continental student will diligently go on
reading cases and statutes in pursuit of the answers to problems that
keep multiplying. Leaving aside the troubles he will experience with
statutes and statutory compilations completely different from those with
which he is accustomed,'6 let me quickly sketch what I think will be
his typical attitude in reading cases. Many of his problems stem from
this attitude. After reading a number of cases, he will feel an urge
to rise above the bewildering richness of factual detail and distill legal
propositions therefrom. He will then attempt to relate these propositions to newly distilled ones from an additional group of cases, and
somehow peg all of them to a larger whole. Only in this fashion does
he hope to come out with (what he would call) legal rules rather than
mere answers to questiones facti or examples of the application of
rules. More often than not, his structure collapses in the bewildering
mass of cases seemingly or actually contradictory.' 6
35 Of these difficulties arising from differences in statutes, four seem to me to be
most common. First, the Continental student feels a lack of vision resulting from
frequent American classification in alphabetical sequence rather than in some kind of
logical order. Second, the student is bewildered by regulation of miniscule detail, and
by all the dangers such an approach entails. Third, he wonders whether the prolific
use of near synonyms in the statutory language results in real or only apparent tautologies. For example, what is the difference between reversing and vacating a judgment?
Last but not least, the Continental student approaches statutory interpretation in the
civil law fashion, which is reminiscent of the ancient English "equity-of-the-statute"
doctrine. And he is often at a loss as to the precise scope of authority granted to
bodies charged with statutory compilation. Precise information on sources is of first
importance to a Continental mind.
1 There are many additional difficulties which Continental lawyers must surmount
in attempting to find the law in the reported cases, but considerations of brevity have
limited discussion in the text to the most important one for my purposes. However,
I should point out a related source of surprise to a civilian trained lawyer. He will be
astonished at how many issues are unsettled in areas which to his mind should be
firmly established. The fact that this unfinishedness in the law does not alarm the
legal profession will be even more surprising. Perhaps an example is needed. In
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the Supreme Court finally rejected the "mere
evidence rule" (a rule which, incidentally, was incredible to the European mind), but
reserved the question whether certain evidentiary objects are "by their nature" pre-
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It is not improbable that at this point the Continental student
will become so frustrated that he will seek solace in a discussion with
his adviser on the openness of the system and on its fluidity. If his
adviser happens to belong to the realist school of legal thought, he may
attempt to help him with a little psychoanalysis t la Jerome Frank, and
explain the student's longing for stability and certainty in terms of
the immature child's need for infallible authority.
This brings me to problems of communication in legal discussion.
Claiming no great discoveries, I can see at least four sources of difficulty. The first is produced by disparities in the level of discourse.
As has been repeatedly intimated, the Continental tends to move on
the level of abstract rules which to his American counterpart often
seem to be only rather vague standards.' In contrast, American legal
discussion usually proceeds on the more concrete level of what a
Continental would consider to be less significant questiones facti.
Second, the strength of legal arguments differs substantially. Logical
consistency over areas too wide for American taste is of very great
importance to a Continental mind, which in turn remains closed to
many specific arguments much higher on the American scale.'" In
the third place, the Continental conceptual scheme imposes relatively
rigid methods of analysis, while the non-grammatical American legal
cluded from being searched and seized. To a Continental lawyer it seems imperative
that if such objects exist they should be enumerated, particularly in view of the exclusionary rule. The Continental would probably say that if the Court felt that it
could not resort to judicial law-making as it did in the celebrated case of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), then some sort of quick legislative action was needed.
The attitude of postponing the settlement of important issues until the exigencies of
some future case require it, and the resulting unfinishedness of the legal system are, I
submit, sources of great frustration to the Continental lawyer studying American law.
17For example, Perkins treats provisions of the Model Penal Code dealing with
the insanity test as standards, too vague to be called rules. R. PERmKIN S, CRIMINAL
LAw 766 (1957). To a Continental lawyer the language of the Model Penal Code
indicates a rule, not too broad in scope at all.
18 On the different role of logical arguments, see Tunc & Tunc, supra note 9, at
205, 236. The authors state that anything in French law which is not impervious to
analytical attack will not remain law for long. This, I believe, holds true of other
Continental systems as well. The unreceptivity of Continentals to pragmatic arguments in a related field is delightfully illustrated in A. RAPAIoRT, OP1RATIONAL
PHLoso'ny 113 (1965). I think the characterization is applicable pari ratione in law.
Perhaps I should add that some Continental arguments strike American lawyers
as formalistic, almost pedantic. To an American, Continentals appear to be unduly
disturbed by some merely ministerial problems or what at least some Americans might
label empty rituals. For example, the Continental lawyer would be terribly disturbed
because, in most jurisdictions, statutes can take effect without official publication.
Pragmatic arguments about alternative routes of communication, or scepticism about
the effectiveness of the publication would not be likely to persuade the Continental.
Similarly the Continental would be intrigued about the status of a judgment attacked
on "habeas corpus" after relief has been granted. If the judgment is not formally invalidated how can a new prosecution be instituted? That defendants are sometimes
permitted to take an appeal before a final adverse judgment would strike the Continental as violative of elementary procedural ideas. Concern about the precise scope
of authority granted to bodies charged with statutory compilation falls into the same
category of Europeans' preoccupation with "minor technicalities."
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mind remains very flexible. 9 Finally, the very goals of legal discussion frequently will not coincide. The Continental will seek the
right solution; his counterpart will display a liberal agnosticism about
"right" answers, coupled with a procedural outlook. He will be
primarily concerned about good arguments for a case.20
We need not go any further. It should have become obvious that
real acclimation to an American law school calls for much more
than merely forgetting about traditional Continental boundaries of
law. It seems to me that the student must be flexible enough to
discard-in dealing with American law-a large part of what is
essential to the formation of a successful Continental law student.
IV. A MOVE

TO RECONCILIATION

If, as I hope, I have captured something of the difficulties a
Continental lawyer experiences in adjusting to American law schools,
the question arises whether something can be done about it. Some
psychological help may come from the realization that one's problems
are shared by others in his position. But I do not think this is the
whole story. This belief gives me the temerity to make a number of
observations on guidance in the adjustment process.
In his first steps the Continental lawyer must be under the wing
of people with real understanding of his adjustment difficulties. This
is so obvious that I must apologize for stating it if I am wrong in
believing that orientation programs are not sufficiently geared to
Continental cognitive needs and often seem to be -designed more to
establish beachheads than to build bridges. There are many people
in this country who are well equipped to counsel Continental lawyers
facing adjustment problems, because they have themselves successfully
undergone the difficult transformation from a Continental to an
American legal mind. Even those who never really made the transition and are still somewhat uncomfortable in American law are still
marvelous guides; those who can speak with the authority of failure
have a lesson to teach. On the other hand, the most illustrious
members of the American legal profession will not be of much help if
19 See note 3 mipra.

2The opinions which lawyers from different systems hold of one another-at
least as long as better understanding is not achieved on a common project-are affected
by the dissonance described in the text. A student who is outstanding by Continental
standards may be considered somewhat diffuse, interested in vague generalities rather
than actual litigation problems. In discussion he may be thought too conceptualistic
and rigid, sometimes possibly pedantic. He will seem to be more interested in learning
than in analysing and arguing. Often he will not be able to give "useful" information
about his law. On the other hand, he will display an uncanny ability to provide the
kind of orientative answers which could be given in this country only after long study,
if at all.
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they lack the insight that comes from experience. A word may be
in order here on the most promising candidates for easy adjustment.
I believe that the more practical experience the Continental lawyer has,
the less severe his adjustment problems will be. Law school graduates
without any exposure to the practice of law will be in the most
difficult situation. Continental scholarly types with academic interests
21
in American law will face grave adjustment problems.
As I see it, initial orientation must emphasize the field of law that
happens to be the center of the Continental lawyer's interest. The
occasional student with an undifferentiated interest in American law
should be viewed with some suspicion. Of course, here we run into
the problem of differences in divisions of law. Therefore, as soon
as the foreigner's field of choice is known, he should be told which
divisions of American law and which law school courses encompass the
problems in which he is interested. It is not impossible that it will
soon appear that the situs of the foreigner's interest is outside the
boundaries of American law, and that courses dealing with his problem
are taught in other departments of an American university. For
example, some areas of European financial law would in America be
treated under the rubric of economics or political science. The foreign
lawyer must be saved the time he may lose tracing the problems in
which he is interested through the perplexing divisions of American
law and the wide variety of course offerings in American law schools.
Comparative law literature dealing specifically with this problem is,
unfortunately, rather scarce.22 Thus, more often than not the Continental lawyer cannot merely be assigned readings; he will have to
rely on consultations with his guide.
Having learned where to find the legal problems he is interested
in and which courses to take, the foreign lawyer will feel a pressing
need for a panoramic view of the substantive rules in his field of
choice. Due to the differences in the nature of the legal systems, there
will be great limitations on what he can be offered in order to satisfy
his intellectual needs. Discussions with his mentor on the difficulties
of gaining a bird's eye view of American law in his specialty may,
however, go a long way towards reducing adjustment problems. More21 Perhaps this holds true of visiting professors as well. I have often thought
that to many Americans a lawyer of the German "repetitor" type would be a much
more interesting conversational partner than the typical scholarly, introverted Continental law professor. The "repetitor," who prepares young lawyers for their practical examinations, is often a brilliant man whose legal honoratoires are courts. He
is conversant with the latest decision and will often display a somewhat sarcastic
attitude toward professors and legal theory in general.
22 The second part of Merryman's study of the Italian style seems to me to be an
excellent model for orientational comparative literature. See Merryman, The Italian
Style II: Law, 18

STAN.

L. REv. 396 (1966).

1968]

CONTINENTAL LAWYER

over, I am not at all convinced that much more cannot be done by
way of mapping various fields of American law in an organized and
coherent fashion attuned to European cognitive needs. Often much
more may be safely generalized than is usually thought possible.'
A very useful device for initiating the Continental student into
differences of organization and conceptual technique might be to
compare the contents of standard European and American treatises.
As an illustration, imagine that civil procedure is involved. Going
over the contents of a Continental text, the mentor could briefly
explain that an American book on civil procedure will contain no
comparable discussion of sources, jurisdiction and competence, or
standing, no discussion of evidence, and so forth. He might point out,
when necessary, which Continental topics have no equivalent in
American law and which are found in other fields. After a number
of sessions devoted to this kind of discussion, the student will gain
some understanding of the "conversion formulae" in his field. At
this early stage he will also obtain some feeling for the limitations
inherent in any attempt to translate legal grammar from one legal
system to another. A number of illustrations may provide an early
awareness of the differences in legal argument and of the typical
communication problems in legal discussion.
At this point let me explain an ostensible contradiction. Most
people would probably agree that a Continental student will become
fully adjusted only after he has learned how to think in the American
legal idiom rather than attempting to "translate" Continental into
American law. Then why should help be offered with the conversion
formulae and panoramic view in the Continental fashion? Are we
not prolonging rather than shortening the adjustment period? It is
my belief that the attempt to "literally" translate from one system into
another is, at least in the initial stages, a cognitive need one cannot
obviate. Whatever information on a point of American law the
foreign lawyer is given, he will want to relate it to what he already
knows in his own legal system. To put it in more abstract terms, one
cannot-as a lawyer-study foreign law without legal comparison.
And the Continental will, whether one likes it or not, begin by
comparing concepts and legal doctrines. Very few temporary visitors
will outgrow this stage and truly go inside American law. Even
fewer will realize that mere conceptual and doctrinal comparison, in
23One could make up a long list of publications which are designed for Continental lawyers but which show little or no awareness of their cognitive needs. There
are, however, a few works that respond to the special requirements and interests of
the Continental embarking on the study of American law. An outstanding example,
although it possibly attempts to cover too broad a field, is R. PARKER, DAS PRIVATRFCHT DER VmE-MNIraN STAATEN VON AmERIK. (1960).
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addition to its limitations, is rather sterile. Thus, in a typical case,
adjustment difficulties cannot be eliminated. They can only be reduced,
by explaining to the student the clash between his expectations and
what he can be offered, by satisfying his cognitive needs, and by
indicating-as the process goes along-which Continental attitudes
must be discarded if the student is truly to go inside the foreign
legal system.
Does all this mean that I am pessimistic about the usefulness to
Continental lawyers of relatively short exposures to the study of
American law in the law schools in this country? The answer turns
on what the expectations of the foreign lawyer are. If he expects to
learn about American law in his field, learn it in the way in which
he would the corresponding field of law in a Continental school, then
I must be pessimistic. I also have some doubts that he will ever truly
understand how it is that American lawyers manage to operate successfully in their system. But, on the other hand, it seems to me
that even brief contacts with American legal education will afford the
Continental lawyer many new insights. Most of them will originate
in the American approach to legal problems. Probably for the first
time, the Continental will become aware-on a plane less exalted than
the jurisprudential-of where the limits of useful generalization lie and
where the dangers of conceptualism lurk. Another spectrum will be
visible to the European lawyer as a result of specific insights into
how rigid classification can prevent a lawyer from following a social
problem to its satisfactory conclusion. The Continental will become
more sensitive to discrepancies between the printed word of the law
and its actual practice. Perhaps most important, he will learn the art
of-and develop an hospitable attitude towards-the functional integration of related disciplines into a number of legal fields. What the
grammatical sophistication of Continental law fears as a threat to its
purity, the open and flexible American system welcomes as a
contribution.
Thus it is not improbable that many Continental lawyers, comfortably back in their natural legal habitat, will suddenly discover an
infection by, as well as an affection for, that strange, never fully
understood system of law which caused them so much trouble when
they attempted to master it. May I thus close by referring you to
Andri Maurois's thought expressed in the motto?
Nous ne nous sommes pas faits,
comme des notes de musique les
uns pour les autres parce que
diff rents?

